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A B S T R A C T   
This paper adopts a geosocial approach to sociopolitical research by thinking with sediment as a forceful mode of 
terraqueous mobility driven by interactions between dynamic earth systems inflected by social processes. It 
demonstrates that sediment is an active and vital state of matter, with the potential to erupt into and disrupt 
human politics. Unpacking sediment as a form of movement challenges assumptions of the earth as a stable 
platform on which socio-political processes play out. The paper develops its argument through analyses of the 
Rohingya refugee camps in southeast Bangladesh and a char (sediment) island in the Meghna Estuary to which 
Bangladesh proposes to relocate the refugees. In the first situation, the sedimentary logics of anticline geology, 
deforestation and monsoon rains push back against political agendas directed towards constraining refugee 
movement. In the second, fluvial and oceanic sedimentary dynamics and the post-Holocene volatility of the 
monsoon throw into doubt the engineering solution proposed by Bangladesh to the political problems the refugee 
presence poses. Through these examples, the paper adds to literature on how states of matter inflect, exceed, 
undercut or in other ways interfere with matters of state through their unique, dynamic environmental 
properties.   
1. Introduction 
In their introduction to the special issue of Theory Culture and Society: 
Geosocial Formations and the Anthropocene, Nigel Clark and Kathryn 
Yusoff (2017: 3) argued that for some time “most social thought has 
taken the earth to be the stable platform upon which dynamic social 
processes play out.” However, they argued, contemporary climate 
change and the Anthropocene thesis are prompting social thought to 
engage more closely with the dynamics of earth systems and to consider 
how social and political agency is constrained, made possible and 
emergent with earth forces. This proposition reiterated Elizabeth 
Grosz’s (2012) call to think through rather than about the earth and to 
afford political power to “the elemental forcefulness of the earth itself” 
(Clark, 2017b, p. 223). 
In this paper I take up this geosocial approach to sociopolitical 
research by thinking with the materiality and mobility of sediment and 
sedimentary processes. My interest in sediment arises from an ongoing 
research project into the monsoon as a global weather system and its 
socio-political entanglements in south and southeast Asia. While sedi-
ment rarely features in materialist geopolitical analyses except as sedi-
mentary strata (Clark, 2017b; Yusoff, 2017) and is largely absent from 
hydropolitical analyses that focus on water (Kaika, 2005; Linton, 2010; 
Swyngedouw, 2004, 2015), it features strongly in monsoonal political 
analyses (Cederlof, 2014; Lahiri-Dutt & Samanta, 2013). This promi-
nence is predicated on the annual cycle of monsoon rains that transform 
soil and strata into terraqueous sediment in vast quantities and mobilize 
it in ways that have long evaded attempts to govern it (Da Cunha, 2018; 
D’Souza, 2006). The monsoon, in other words, introduces hydrological 
dynamics to territory and sediment to politics. It stretches materialist 
theories of politics into dynamic geohydro sedimentary terrains (Elden, 
2017). 
Thinking with sediment as a geosocial materiality brings the paper 
into conversation with recent work on the geopolitics of material plan-
etary mobilities (Peters, 2015; Peters, Steinberg & Stratford, 2018, 
particularly the chapters by Nieuwenhuis and Whitt). Nieuwenhuis 
(2018) discusses the mechanics of air-born sediment as it whirls around 
in suspension and Whitt (2018) analyses the sticky viscosity of mud and 
its translation into political disputes and bodily discomforts. Both speak 
to what I attempt to do with sediment in this paper. As are dust and mud, 
sediment is a mobile, terraqueous state of matter that challenges 
imaginaries of terra firma and undercuts notions of territory as dry, 
stable or bounded. Sediment is a reminder that territory was born when 
the geometers of the Nile River settlements retraced the borders of fields 
each each year when the river’s flood waters withdrew (Clark, 2017b; 
Elden, 2013). From this annual apportioning of alluvial deposits, poli-
tics, laws and territory were born (Serres, 1995). Territory, in other 
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words, was a political technology of sediment (Clark, 2017a). As such, it 
was always provisional and open to annulment by subsequent flows of 
earthly matter-on-the move. 
Sediment is the product of the decomposition of earth strata by 
weather. It is particulate matter formed when surface strata are me-
chanically or chemically broken down by exposure to the atmosphere, 
and then carried by air, water or technology across the surface of the 
earth. Sediment thus exceeds its identification with sedimentation, un-
derstood as the concentration and layering of forces into strata (Yusoff, 
2017). It is earthly matter in a mode of terraqueous or terraerial 
mobility. Its properties arise from processes of weathering, erosion, 
saltation and alluviation that characterize the dynamic reworking of the 
earth’s surface by weather, wind and water. These dynamics and the 
characteristics of sedimentary movement they give rise to call for 
geopolitical theorization as much as strata do. By tracking and telling 
stories of how sediments form, travel and settle, of who or what they 
meet along the way and of the political disputes they become tangled up 
with, possibilities for re-thinking the materiality of politics are opened 
up (Cresswell, 2010; Peters, 2015). 
In this paper, an analytic of sediment is brought to bear on the 
stateless condition of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. In international 
law, a stateless person is one who is not considered to be a national by 
any state under the operation of law and whose rights as defined by law 
are denied (Goris, Harington & Kohn, 2009). This denial includes denial 
of jus soli, the law of the soil, which provides that those born in the 
territory of a country have the right to citizenship of that country. To be 
stateless is not only a juridical category, but also a material, environ-
mental one - denial of access to soil. This does not mean that the stateless 
are without soil, but rather that their access to soil is fragile, tenuous and 
always provisional. In the paper I argue that in the Rohingya refugee 
camps in south-east Bangladesh and the char (sediment island) in the 
Meghna Estuary to which Bangladesh proposes to relocate the refugees, 
the materiality of sediment undercuts statist mechanisms to assign the 
Rohingya to soil, albeit temporarily. In the first situation, the sedimen-
tary logics of anticline geology, deforestation and monsoon rains un-
dermine the statist-humanitarian assemblage Bangladesh has put in 
place to accommodate the Rohingya. In the second, fluvial and oceanic 
sedimentary dynamics and the post-Holocene volatility of the monsoon 
throw into doubt the engineering solutions proposed by Bangladesh to 
shore up its solution to the political problems the refugee presence 
poses. In both cases, sediment serves as an affective reminder of the 
unruliness of territorial materialities in relation to statist agendas, as 
well as of the precarity and valuelessness of stateless life to statist 
machines. 
The paper comprises five sections. The first section discusses the 
dynamics of sedimentary mobility and its potential for violent territorial 
and social disruption. The second introduces the reader to the Rohingya 
and their relations with Bangladesh, sketching out the complex layers of 
historic entanglement between them. In the third and fourth sections, 
the paper discusses the Rohingya camps in southeast Bangladesh and the 
char island in the Meghna Estuary through the analytic of sediment. The 
paper argues that in both situations the vast humanitarian “apparatus of 
capture” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 424) assembled by Bangladesh to 
contain and constrain the refugees is exceeded and undercut by sedi-
mentary logics. The paper concludes by summarizing its contribution to 
emerging fields of scholarship on volatile, intractable more-than-human 
terrains which impede or disrupt a state’s vision (Usher, 2019). 
In preparing the paper, I consulted and integrated a range of litera-
tures and sources. These ranged from scientific literature on sedimentary 
processes in Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal (Rogers & Overeem, 
2017; Brammer, 2014; Uddin, Alam, Khan, Hasan, & Rahman, 2014; 
Hussain et al., 2012; Rogers, 2012; Mohanti, Nayak, Pradhan, & Panda, 
2008; Keuhl, Levy, Moore, & Mead, 1997) to historical texts on the 
Rohingya (Abdelkader, 2013; Chan, 2005; Yegar, 1972). Grey literature 
(UN and other NGO reports) of the Rohingya crisis as it developed from 
2017 onwards was a source of information about the refugee camps, and 
I visited the UN’s Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA) in Yangon in 2018 and interviewed several researchers who 
were working in the Rohingya camps in both Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
In addition to this, given that the situation I was researching was current 
and fast moving, I worked with media reports, though I was limited to 
what I could access online and in English. The Dhaka Tribune, a national 
English language daily in Bangladesh, was particularly thorough in its 
coverage of the refugee crisis as it unfolded. In relation to the facility on 
Bhasan Char, few, other than those who work there are able to access it 
and information about it is limited. I gleaned what I could from online 
sources – media reports, satellite imagery and YouTube videos made by 
reporters who had managed to visit it. The data informing the paper was 
thus a patchwork of information from multiple, diverse sources. The 
data were analyzed from the perspective of what they revealed about the 
dynamics of sediment and sedimentary processes, insofar as they 
interfered with the territorializing impulses of the statist-humanitarian 
machine in the refugee camps of Bangladesh. The paper is an attempt 
to integrate these various sources to produce new insights into the 
constraints placed on geopolitics by dynamic terraqueous, sedimentary 
terrains. 
2. Sediment 
This paper owes considerable debt to Nigel Clark (2017b: 211) idea 
of the “politics of strata.” Prompted by Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 
1987) who “keep coming back to the idea that our planet pulses with the 
possibility of destratification, new combinational possibilities, reorga-
nization.” Clark (2017b: 213) proposes that “all human life - all life in 
general - plays on the potentiality of the “stratifying-destratifying 
earth.” This idea taps into ideas present in Nietzsche (1968), Bataille 
(1991) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987) of the earth and its strata as 
excessive, ungrounded and ungrounding. While “the process of strati-
fication might lock in the flux, free play and intensities of a particular 
strain of matter-energy … strata remain a locus of essential redundancy, 
the embodiment of a potentiality that always exceeds their current state” 
(Clark, 2017b, p. 224). Clark quotes from stratigrapher Jan Zalasiewicz 
(2008: 17) who describes the earth as “a gigantic machine for producing 
strata.” Its mechanics are driven by the “churning currents of magma in 
the inner earth” (Clark, 2017b, p. 213) powered by the radioactivity of 
the planetary core, and by the earth’s atmospheric and hydrological 
circulation systems, propelled by incoming solar energy (Zalasiewicz, 
2008). Produced by interactions between the earth’s coupled systems - 
the lithosphere, the biosphere, the hydrosphere and the atmosphere, 
strata and strata forming processes are the forcefulness through which 
life and politics unfold (Clark, 2017b; Grosz, 2012; Yusoff, 2017). 
Sediment is the product of these interacting earth systems. It is what 
happens to strata when they are exposed to weather, when their par-
ticulate matter is unlocked or chemically transformed by the atmosphere 
and carried by air, water or technology across the surface of the earth. 
Sediment is lively, restless and, to humans, profoundly unsettling. Sus-
pended in the air or dragged along river beds, sediment moves in lively 
constellations by saltating (from the Latin salire, to leap, and saltare, to 
dance) along. In water, its particles form turbulent, relational terr-
aqueous assemblings, along with liquids, surfaces, textures, other 
organic and inorganic matter, gravity, slope, shape and volume. As they 
move, sediment particles are abraded, scratched, rubbed and generally 
worn down by friction until they end up as tiny fragments a fraction of a 
mm across, when they become viscous and sticky. In places these par-
ticles aggregate and accumulate, in others they undercut and erode, in 
others they flow on unimpeded. Over long periods of time, they pile up, 
push down and lithify into new layers of sedimentary strata - shale, 
sandstone, siltstone or claystone – awaiting remobilization by future 
tectonic upheaval. Sedimentologists tell us that while sedimentary rocks 
comprise only about five per cent by volume of the terrestrial crust, they 
make up eighty to ninety per cent of its surface and contain its entire 
store of groundwater and fossil fuels (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019). 
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Sediments are thus the earth’s liveliness, its archives (Yusoff, 2017) and 
its storage deposits. They serve as testament to the earth’s history, and 
increasingly, to human interference with it (Zalasiewicz et al., 2008). 
In the northern part of south Asia, a billion tons of sediment is 
transported each year from the Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal by the 
Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers and their many tributaries. 
For most of the year these rivers carry their sediment load sluggishly, but 
during the monsoon rains from June to October they change into 
forceful, sediment heavy torrents. These rivers evade the logics of hy-
drology because they are too weighed down with sediment, and of 
strata, because they are too mobile. To understand them requires 
thinking with the logics of sedimentary mobility. Here I was inspired by 
Peters (2015) whose paper ‘Drifting: Towards Mobilities at Sea,’ pro-
posed that thinking through drifting as a mode of mobility (what it is, 
who or what drifts, how and under what conditions and what it means 
and how it feels to drift) unlocks knowledge about the earth beyond that 
of static, solid earthiness. I propose that thinking through sedimentary 
mobility offers similar insights. 
Sediments, whether dragged along a surface or in suspension in air or 
a fluid, move by saltating (from the Latin salire, to leap, and saltare, to 
dance) along (Parsons, Cooper, & Wainwright, 2015). At low velocities, 
particles stay in contact with the lower surface and roll along. This is 
called creep or reptation. Here the forces exerted by the fluid on particles 
are only enough to roll them over the point of contact with the surface. 
Once fluid velocity reaches a certain critical value, the drag and lift 
forces exerted by the fluid are sufficient to lift particles against gravity 
from the surface. Particles are accelerated by the fluid, but pulled 
downward by gravity at the same time, causing them to travel in roughly 
ballistic trajectories. If particles obtain sufficient speed from the accel-
eration by the fluid, they bounce up again and can eject, or splash, other 
particles in saltation, which intensifies the process. Particles might also 
disintegrate on impact with a surface or eject finer sediment particles 
from their mass. In air, this process is known as saltation bombardment 
and creates most of the dust in dust storms. While moving, sediment 
particles are also worn down and reshaped, their bumps, angles or 
smoothness recording their journey. Sediments are thus lively 
trans-corporeal bodies (Alaimo, 2018), barely distinguishable from the 
dynamics and characteristics of their mobility. In their interactions with 
fluids, gravity, surface, texture, area and gradient they form an 
intra-active, turbulent process of mutual becoming (Parsons et al., 
2015). 
In describing this dance of sediments, the reader might have noticed 
that I have used militaristic terminology - ballistic trajectory, projectile, 
bombardment. This terminology is used because saltation is a mode of 
mobility in which a fluid transforms sediment particles into little mis-
siles set against and reshaping each other and the environments they 
move through. This mobility carries with it the potential for violent 
territorial and social disruption. In Bangladesh it can result in sudden, 
territorial ruptures known in Bengali as chapa banga, banga or hanria 
banga. 
Chapa banga literally means the breaking of the bank in chaps 
(chunky portions) and occurs during the rainy season when the rivers 
overflow in swift currents … Banga or the breaking of the soil can 
wipe our large pieces of land - from one to two acres - in a matter of 
minutes. The breaking is often preceded by a sound that can be heard 
from a distance and the formation of large rings of circular water 
currents called ghurnis that loosen the soil along the bank walls and 
make them slide immediately. Hanria bhanga means the breaking 
away of the soil as if it is a clean sweep down to the bottom of a hanri 
(a round cooking pot). In hanria bhanga, the strong, speedy and sharp 
undercurrent of the river cuts through the soft, sandy layer and 
reaches two to three kilometres inland from the bank (Lahiri-Dutt & 
Samanta, 2013: 40–41). 
These ruptures produce what is known in Bangladesh as “the land of 
Allah jaane (of God only knows)” (Baqee (1998) in Lahiri-Dutt (2014: 
24), referring to the precarious, nomadic units of land called chars that 
emerge from sedimentary processes each year. These lands are transient 
assemblages of geo-hydro matter-energy that move around each year 
and may disappear without notice. They have historically been occupied 
by precarious, marginal populations, often those without official docu-
ments. Those who live on them lead perilous, calamitous lives. When the 
monsoon breaks and the flow of the river increases each year, their land 
frequently deserts them, their shelters are devastated, crops are 
damaged and livestock washed away. As the river recedes, new chars 
emerge and fierce, at times violent struggles to occupy them ensue. 
These are overseen by local strongmen who exert unquestioned au-
thority over the distribution of land, and subject char dwellers to sub-
servience (Lahiri-Dutt, 2014; Lahiri-Dutt & Samanta, 2004). This land 
cannot be mapped or legally owned or recorded in revenue papers 
because it moves around too quickly and too frequently. Attempts to 
control it go back to when the East India Company took over the man-
agement of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from Mughal Emperor Shah Alam 
in 1765. The British, confounded by the seasonal transmogrification of 
the territory, attempted to fix Bengal’s geo-hydro flows on maps by 
surveying them and on the earth by constructing embankments 
(D’Souza, 2006). However, these measures to engineer the division of 
land from water were disrupted each year by sediment transporting 
monsoonal torrents. 
3. The Rohingya 
The Rohingya are Muslims of the Mayu Frontier of Myanmar’s 
Rakhine (formerly Arakan) State. Rhakine lies between the Bay of 
Bengal and the Arakan Mountains and borders Bangladesh across the 
Naf River. The history of the Muslim presence in Rhakine State is 
disputed. Rohingya historians claim indigenous status traceable back for 
more than 1000 years while others trace Rohingya history back only to 
the 1950s when Bengali Muslim intellectuals began to call themselves 
Rohingya. They were descendants of immigrants from the Chittagong 
District of East Bengal who had migrated to Arakan after it was ceded to 
the British at the end of the first Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) (Chan, 
2005). However, there were Muslim settlers in Arakan long before 1826. 
The earliest of such settlers were the Bengali retinues of King Min Saw 
Mon, the founder of the Mrauk-U Dynasty (1430–1784). They were 
allowed to settle in Mrauk-U after the King regained his throne with 
military assistance from the Sultan of Bengal (Chan, 2005). In the 17th 
Century, the Muslim population in Arakan grew when Bengali slaves 
were acquired by the Arakanese from the Portuguese and assigned to 
agriculture and other services. Arakan was conquered by the Burmese in 
1784, who ruled it until 1824. During this period, many Arakanese fled 
to British Bengal. As a result, when the British annexed Burma in 1826, 
Arakan was scarcely populated. Favouring Bengalis over Burmese, the 
British encouraged Bengali Muslims to migrate as agriculturalists into 
the fertile valleys of Arakan to reinstate former high yield paddy fields. 
At the time, there was no international boundary between Bengal and 
Arakan and no restrictions were imposed on movement between the two 
territories. In the 1830s, thousands of Muslims migrated from Chitta-
gong to Arakan as seasonal labourers. Their labour provided the impetus 
for the economic development of Arakan. Arable land expanded 4.5 
times between 1830 and 1852, regular shipping lines opened between 
Akyab (now Sittwe) and Chittagong and Akyab became one of the major 
rice exporting cities in the world. During this period the British intro-
duced policies favourable to Bengalis in Arakan. These policies included 
the Zamindary System that allocated land on 99 year leases to Bengalis 
while denying leases to the Arakanese. Arakanese peasants who had fled 
Burmese rule and returned after British annexation were thus deprived 
of the land they had previously owned through inheritance. Bengali 
Zamindaries did not want Arakanese as tenants, instead importing 
Bengali peasants to cultivate their lands. As a result, many Chittagonians 
made Arakan their home and after a century of colonial rule they 
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became the numerically dominant social group in the Mayu Frontier 
(Chan, 2005). 
Peaceful co-existence between Muslims and Buddhists in Arakan was 
maintained until beginning of World War Two despite political, ethnic 
and religious cleavages that had been simmering for a century (Chan, 
2005). After the withdrawal of the British from Burma in 1942, ethnic 
violence between Arakan Buddhists and Muslim Chittagonians broke 
out. Yegar (1972) suggests that underlying cause for the violence was 
the Zamindary System, aggravated by Buddhists and Muslims siding 
with the Japanese and the British respectively during the Second World 
War. This conflict transformed the Mayu Frontier into a no-go-zone, 
with many atrocities committed on both sides. In 1946 Arakan Mus-
lims formed the Muslim Liberation Organisation (MLO) and sent a 
delegation to Karachi to discuss a proposal with the leaders of the 
Muslim League to incorporate some of Arakan State’s northern town-
ships into East Pakistan. This proposal was ignored. In 1948, after sub-
sequent demands for recognition made to the newly independent 
government of Burma were also ignored, the MLO, renamed the Mujahid 
Party, destroyed Arakan villages in the north of Maungdaw. In a his-
torical reversal of the Zamindary system, one of the major reasons for 
this rebellion was that Muslims who had fled Japanese occupation were 
not allowed to resettle in their villages (Yegar, 1972). In 1951 the 
Mujahid Party demanded that Northern Arakan become a Muslim State 
as an equal constituent of the Union of Burma. This demand was not 
acceded to. Subsequent uprisings in the guise of Jihad encouraged by 
Muslim clerics gave way to banditry, arson and rape and the frontier was 
thrown into turmoil for a decade. In 1962 a military coup resulted in 
Burma becoming a one-party military state and the Mujahid movement 
was driven underground. In 1982, the military government passed the 
Citizenship Act that recognized only ethnic groups who had lived in 
Burma since before 1824 when the First Anglo-Burmese War began. This 
legislation was designed to deny citizenship rights to Rohingya Muslims, 
most of whom had arrived in Myanmar after 1824. In this way the 
Rohingya became officially stateless. They were subsequently denied 
citizenship documents, education, employment, freedom of movement 
or the right to marry freely and were vulnerable to arbitrary detention, 
forced labor, discriminatory taxation and confiscation of property 
(Abdelkader, 2013). 
In 1978 the Myanmar military had launched a nationwide initiative 
known as Naga Min (Dragon King) to register the population prior to a 
national census. This initiative provoked the flight of 200,000 Rohingya 
into Bangladesh, where they were not welcome and denied food aid to 
force them back to Myanmar. It should be noted that Bangladesh is not a 
signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
nor its 1967 Protocol. The UNCHR only operates in Bangladesh via a 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1993. There is also no specific 
provision for refugees in Bangladesh’s legislative apparatus. The law 
governing their presence is the 1946 Foreigners Act, which grants the 
government the powers and discretion to decide on the scope of the Act’s 
application (UNCHR, 2012). In 1978, more than 12,000 Rohingya ref-
ugees starved to death and others were forcibly repatriated. According 
to one scholar, this hostility was owing to the siding of the Rohingya 
with Pakistan during the Bangladesh War of independence (Yegar, 
1972). 
Again in 1988 and 1992, Rohingya Muslims fled to Bangladesh after 
counter insurgency campaigns against them. After the 1992 incident, 
250,000 remained in Bangladesh. 28,000 were registered as refugees 
and lived in two official United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNCHR) refugee camps, Kutupalong and Nayapara, and up to 220,000 
lived in surrounding villages as undocumented migrants (Sidhu & Par-
nini, 2011). In 1993, the UNCHR and the Bangladesh authorities signed 
a memorandum of understanding guaranteeing protection of the 
Rohingya in the refugee camps and setting out a process of voluntary 
repatriation. At the same time, the UNCHR and Myanmar agreed the 
issuing of identity cards and limited rights to movement and employ-
ment for those who returned to Myanmar. Between 1993 and 1997, 230, 
000 Rohingya returned to Rakhine State, though many subsequently 
went back to Bangladesh (Danish Immigration Service, 2011). In March 
2016 Aun San Suu Kyi’s democratically elected government took office 
in Myanmar and hopes were high that Rohingya citizenship would be 
restored. In October 2016 however, attacks were launched on police 
posts in northern Rhakine State allegedly by Rohingya militants. The 
subsequent security operations saw 87,000 Rohingya flee into 
Bangladesh. In August 2017 further attacks on police posts resulted in 
hundreds of Rohingya villages being burned to the ground. A mass 
exodus of 600,000 Rohingya followed in 2017. They joined the esti-
mated 200,000 Rohingya already living in Bangladesh concentrated in 
its two southernmost upazilas (districts), Ukhia and Teknaf. The refugees 
were accommodated in refugee camps, makeshift settlements and local 
villages or stranded in the border regions of Bandarban and Cox’s Bazaar 
(United Nations & Partners, 2017). Here a geological borderland of 
sub-ducting, folding tectonic plates is substrate to a frontier culture, 
where traditionalism meets Islam meets Buddhism and weak institutions 
of democracy are subject to political, ethnic and religious violence and 
cleavage (Guhathakurta, 2018). 
4. Anticline geology 
The Rohingya refugee camps are concentrated on the Teknaf 
Peninsula, a narrow finger of land sixty km long and five to ten km wide 
between the Bay of Bengal and the Naf River, which is the boundary 
between Bangladesh and Myanmar (Fig. 1). To the north of the penin-
sula is an area of approximately 40 sq. km (4000 ha) that is recognized 
as protected forest by the Bangladesh Forest Department. In September 
2017, 800 ha of this forest were allocated for the extension of the 
UNCHR’s Kutupalong camp set up by the 1993 Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between the UNCHR and Bangladesh. Prior to the 2017 
influx, Kutupalong was home to 13,900 refugees. 100,000 undocu-
mented Rohingya lived in makeshift settlements around it (Danish 
Immigration Service, 2011). To its south, separated by a swathe of for-
est, was Bulukhali, another makeshift settlement. By 8 November 2017, 
these settlements had become contiguous, forming the 
Kutupalong-Balukhali expansion site. It was the largest refugee settle-
ment in the world, housing over 600,000 refugees. Just to its south the 
Jamtoli, Hakimpara and Potibonia settlements housed another 100,000 
refugees. Further south, Nayapara and Leda had joined to form a third 
sprawling concentration of more than 88,000 refugees, spreading into 
surrounding villages (Strategic Executive Group, 2018) and an esti-
mated 56,000 refugees were absorbed into host communities (Tani & 
Rahman 2018). 
The 2017 influx of 600,000 Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh was 
met by an extensive administrative machine, which Deleuze and Guat-
tari (1987: 424) might call a humanitarian “apparatus of capture.” It was 
coordinated by a National Task Force set up by Bangladesh, chaired by 
the Foreign Secretary with participation from twenty-two ministries, 
including the military, security and intelligence agencies. A District Task 
Force led by the District Commissioner monitored and coordinated ac-
tivities on the ground. These initiatives were supported by the human-
itarian sector, through an Inter-Sectoral Coordination Group (ISCG) 
hosted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) under the 
UNCHR’s Resident Co-coordinator. By March 2018, the humanitarian 
sector included 130 organisations, ranging from UN Agencies, the Red 
Cross and the Red Crescent to civil society, faith and government based 
organisations (Strategic Executive Group, 2018). The refugee camps 
were divided into zones each managed by a government-appointed 
Camp-in-Charge official. Humanitarian agencies were allocated to 
zones as site management partners. Refugees were organized into 
groups of two hundred families run by Rohingya leaders selected by the 
Bangladesh military (Karim, 2018). Refugees did not have freedom of 
movement to leave the camps or the right to take up work outside the 
camps. A large surveillance system was set up, including a network of 
internal and external intelligence officers who controlled who and what 
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could or could not enter the camps, ostensibly to prevent drugs and 
human trafficking and recruitment by militant groups (Karim, 2018). At 
least twenty-seven military checkpoints monitored movement in and out 
of the area (Safi, 2018). 
This vast governmental and humanitarian apparatus served as a 
machine of capture to organize, consolidate and compress the multidi-
rectional flows of humans, medicines, aid, food, drugs, arms etc. in and 
out of the camps, between camps and surrounding settlements and in 
and out of Bangladesh. It was a stratigraphic machine to lock down the 
intensities and flows of matter mobilized by the refugee influx into a 
manageable socio-political entity (Yusoff, 2017). In doing so however it 
mobilized other forces and flows - the enactment of stability on one level 
disrupted what had previously been stable geophysical and geopolitical 
strata (Colebrook, 2017). It exerted considerable pressure on its 
geological substrate and its topographic surface layers. South-east 
Bangladesh where the camps are located has a topography of steep, 
Fig. 1. Map showing the location of and number of residents in the Rohingya refugee camps in Ukhia and Teknaf in Bangladesh in February 2018. Map drawn by the 
author after Strategic Executive Group (2018: p. 5). 
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parallel, north-south orientated hills and valleys formed when the In-
dian tectonic plate collided into the Shillong Plateau between 2.6 and 66 
million years ago. Its geological substrate is made up of layers of sand-
stone, siltstone and claystone that manifest their tectonic history in 
folds, faults, steep tilts and sharp faulted anticlines (Quazi, 1986). An 
anticline is a ridge or fold of stratified rock in which the strata follow the 
angle of the topography. This arrangement means that the oldest beds 
are at the centre of the fold and the newer, less compressed strata lie on 
the surface. They are less firmly consolidated and subject to weathering 
and erosion. As a result, the narrow valleys of south-east Bangladesh are 
alluvial, fertile and cultivated, while slopes and hilltops are forested to 
stabilise their soils. The forests are significant wildlife habitats and also 
conscripted into a well established social forestry program providing an 
income to local villagers through the growing and selling of timber 
(Hossain, Alam, & Miah, 2008). 
This terrain was unsettled and its material and ecological disposi-
tions transformed by the speed and manner in which the refugees were 
settled on it (Fig. 2). Refugee families were each allocated a portion of 
forested hillside by a Camp-in-Charge official. They removed its vegetal 
growth and levelled it into roughly formed terraces. Makeshift shelters 
of bamboo and plastic were erected. Terraces were connected by narrow 
footpaths and bamboo bridges to hand pumps and tube wells, latrines, 
wash rooms and social facilities. Flat, low lying valleys that were still 
being cultivated or susceptible to flooding were avoided. Permanent 
construction materials other than bricks for roads and concrete for 
drains were not permitted as they would give permanence to the refugee 
presence. Once settled in this way, refugees turned to surrounding for-
ests for fuel. West of the camps, the forests receded rapidly as they made 
ever longer journeys to collect the estimated eight hundred tons of 
firewood the camps required each day, which then filled the air with 
wood smoke and heightened respiratory infections (FAO, 2017). As of 
January 2018, 1485 ha of forest land had been “hacked from the hills” 
for settlement or for firewood (Suman, 2018). A Bangladesh Forestry 
Department (BFD) officer summed this up: “They are cutting down the 
hills, they’re chopping all the trees, herbs, shrubs, then erecting their 
shelters … the topography of that area has been greatly damaged” 
(Ahmed, 2018). 
The speed and violence of these transformations loosened the earth 
and disrupted ecological and geopolitical relations. For instance, 
deforestation of the hillsides for settlement disrupted a social forestry 
program, causing tensions between authorities, refugees and villagers 
who requested compensation for their loss of earnings (Strategic Exec-
utive Group, 2018). It disrupted wildlife habitats and habits. The 
Kutupalong–Balukhali expansion site lies across a heavily trafficked 
elephant corridor. As elephants follow habitual routes and destroy any 
obstacles in their paths, human-elephant conflicts on the edges of the 
refugee camp became more frequent and a number of refugees were 
killed (BBC News, 2018; IUCN Bangladesh, 2018). As the monsoon 
approached, the potential for de-stratification increased. The Teknaf 
Peninsula has a high annual rainfall of approximately 4000 mm. It fol-
lows a typical monsoonal pattern, with negligible rain from December to 
March and very heavy rainfall from June to August. Flash floods and 
cyclones frequently occur. It was estimated that more than 200,000 
refuges in the camps were living in zones that would flood or collapse 
(United Nations & Partners, 2017). Root systems that once held the soils 
together had vanished, rendering hillsides unstable and in danger of 
sliding: “I’m afraid that the hills will fall onto us,” a refugee in Chak-
markul, one of the smaller settlements remarked (UNCHR, 2018). 
The imminent release of the geologic forces, fault lines and cleavages 
of the substrate (Yusoff, 2017) by the monsoon was rapidly transformed 
into politics. The monsoon was mobilized as a threat and framed as a 
disaster by different political agents for different ends. Myanmar’s panel 
of international advisors argued that camps in Bangladesh were not built 
to withstand storms and argued that all parties needed to come to an 
Fig. 2. Satellite image of the Kutupalong Refugee Camp to the right and the Kutupalong- Bulukhali Expansion Site to the left in July 2018. Source: Google Earth.  
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understanding on repatriation (Ungku, 2018). The Bangladesh govern-
ment on the other hand used the impending monsoon and delays in the 
repatriation deal as justification for the preparation of Bhasan Char for 
relocation. Aid agencies mobilized the monsoon as a threat to argue for 
additional resources to stabilise the hillsides, dredge waterways and cut 
channels for excess water. The UNCHR identified 150,000 people at high 
risk from mudslides and floods and began to level and stabilise a 9.3-ha 
plot allocated by the Bangladesh government to relocate 12,000 of the 
most vulnerable refugees (Lazarus, 2018). It delivered tens of thousands 
of ‘Monsoon Defence Kits’ comprising bamboo poles, tarpaulins sand-
bags and basic medicines to protect against water-born diseases. Fam-
ilies began reinforcing their shelters in any way they could, with 
sandbags, stronger rope and plastic bottles filled with sediment and 
hurled on the roofs of shelters (Safi, 2018). Cyclone warning training by 
Bangladesh’s Cyclone Preparedness Programme, which had made sig-
nificant progress in reducing lives lost in coastal communities since its 
launch in 1970 (Haque et al., 2012), was extended to the refugee camps 
(UNCHR, 2018). 
The first rains came in April 2018. They transformed the sedimentary 
topography into a hydro-geological force that damaged roads, destroyed 
buildings and blocked drains (Ganguly, 2018). In June 2018, landslides 
triggered by rains were reported to have killed at least thirteen people 
and risk of water borne disease was high as floodwater mingled with 
latrine run-off (Agence-France-Presse, 2018). It was not as if the 
Rohingya were unaccustomed to monsoons, they had lived with them all 
their lives. It was not the monsoon, but the encounter between refugee 
life and the anticline geology of the Teknaf Peninsula that exposed them 
to the surplus potentiality of intersecting earth systems, that is of sedi-
ment, and put their lives at risk. Precipitation rates, location, elevation, 
slope and fine scale differences in sediment grain size and porosity 
became active (though entirely indifferent) agents in the identification 
of who lived and who died and in the prioritisation of humanitarian 
services. The hydro-geo power of the monsoon released the material 
energies of the deforested sedimentary hillsides, turning sediment into a 
weapon against the encamped refugees. This was cited as reason by 
Bangladesh to relocate 100,000 refugees to a char island in the Meghna 
Estuary, which it proposed as a temporary arrangement until conditions 
were right for the refugees to return to Myanmar. 
5. Char 
The sediments of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers 
eventually reach the Bay of Bengal through the Lower Meghna River. 
Here they enter a highly dynamic oceanic system where a complicated 
interplay between the forces of the river, tides and waves creates com-
plex patterns sediment displacement (Rogers, 2012; Rogers & Overeem, 
2017; Uddin et al., 2014). This displacement is strongly influenced by 
the seasonal reversals of the monsoon and the cyclones and storm surges 
that frequently accompany them, amplified by the triangular funnel 
shape of the northern Bay of Bengal (Alam & Dominey-Howes, 2015; 
Michaels, Hidras, Heubscher, Suckow, & Wiedicke, 1998). During the 
wet south-west monsoon months, ocean currents circulate clockwise in a 
northerly direction along the east coast of India. Their collision with the 
freshwater influx of the Lower Meghna River creates anti-clockwise 
currents along the Chittagong coast (Mohanty et al., 2008). The two 
currents converge on the Swatch of No Ground, a fourteen km wide 
ocean canyon stretching for thousands of kms down the centre of the Bay 
of Bengal (Keuhl, Levy, Moore, & Mead, 1997). During the dry 
north-east monsoon months, currents reverse and circulate in the 
opposite direction - sediment is carried away from the Swatch of No 
Ground and southwards along the coasts of India and Bangladesh. These 
reversing patterns can be altered by more distant and apparently unre-
lated geological events. For instance, the 1950 Assam earthquake dis-
lodged so much sediment that the entire course of the Lower Meghna 
River shifted (Brammer, 2014). Human agency also plays its part. Dams 
and embankments, particularly the widespread armouring of the coast 
since the 1960s has greatly impacted sediment dispersal and coastal 
morphology in recent years (Roy, Hanlon, & Hulme, 2016). These fac-
tors all play a role in moving sediment around the northern Bay of 
Bengal in swirling, unruly, irregular ways and influencing the unpre-
dictability of where it accumulates on the ocean floor. Some aggregates 
into shifting estuarine chars, some eventually beds down on the conti-
nental shelf extending Bangladesh’s subaqueous delta, while some is 
carried by the Swatch of No Ground deep into the Bay of Bengal. Over 
time this has produced the Bengal Fan, a 16.5 km thick submarine 
stratum of Himalayan sediment (Keuhl et al., 1997). 
It was into these complex meteorological, fluvial, oceanic and 
anthropocenic churnings of monsoonal sediments that the Bangladesh 
government approved a plan in November 2017 to relocate 100,000 
Rohingya refugees from the camps on the Teknaf Peninsula. In February 
2018 Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced that her country was 
preparing a char, newly renamed Bhasan Char, to house 100,000 
Rohingya refugees as a temporary arrangement until conditions were 
right for them to return to Myanmar. British engineers, H. R. Wallingford 
and Chinese construction company Sinohydro (best known for building 
China’s Three Gorges Dam) were contracted to undertake the engi-
neering works to make the island inhabitable (Paul, Baldwin, & 
Marshall, 2018). 
If one scrolls back historically over the Meghna Estuary on Google 
Earth, a faint dark stain comes into view at approximately 22 230N, 91
230 E in 1988. It spreads northwards in 1989, disappears a year later, 
reappears in 1997, disappears in 1999 and then comes more steadily 
into view from 2003 onwards, moving around each year. In 2006 
another elliptical smudge emerges to its south west, becoming more 
distinct from 2013 onwards. These smudges on Google Earth are satellite 
images of emergent estuarine chars. According to the Bangladesh 
Forestry Department (BFD) (Shaqif, 2017b), Thengar Char, the more 
recently formed of the two is under water during the monsoon from June 
to September and during high tide throughout the year. The older, more 
stable landmass named Jalier Char by local people (meaning ‘fisher-
man’s island’) has a landmass of 20,250 ha, 6500 of which have been 
planted with mangrove forest to stabilise its sediments. Local officials 
call it Char Piya. 
Thengar Char was the name of the island announced by Bangladesh 
as the island designated for Rohingya resettlement. However, develop-
ment activities led by the Bangladesh Navy have been taking place on 
Jalier Char. In an extraordinary report in the Dhaka Tribune (Shaqif, 
2017b) a claim was made that when asked to identify an island for 
relocating the refugees to, the Noakhali District Administration pointed 
to the newer Thengar Char. During an inspection visit however, officials 
landed at Jalier Char, but mistakenly thought they had landed on 
Thengar Char and declared it as the island for development. Possibly to 
clear up the confusion, Sheikh Hasina renamed Jalier Char as Bhasan (or 
Vasan) Char, meaning ‘floating island.’ However, confusion still reigned 
in the media, which was reliant on official records, expert interviews and 
on-line satellite maps for information. Many online maps were not 
current enough to show both islands and many showed the area as open 
sea. The maps used by Reuters identified Jalier Char as Thengar Char 
(Slodkowski, 2017). Google Maps named Jalier Char as Char Piya. A 
report in the Dhaka Tribune in September 2017 reported Bhasan Char as 
the new name for Thengar Char (Kalloi, 2017). As the islands are really 
free-flowing sedimentary matter-energy, they can emerge from the 
ocean only to disappear again or change shape from season to season 
and year to year. They are elusive and confound the temporalities of 
satellite data collection and official practices of naming and mapping. 
They challenge abstract, data driven ways of knowing, in favour of 
highly local, experiential forms of knowledge. In response to questions 
about this, a geomorphologist at Dhaka’s Centre for Environmental and 
Geographic Services remarked that “its very confusing for people to 
identify them because the islands are so new and are not on any official 
records. Only local people know which island is which” (Yanofsky & 
Lahiri, 2017). 
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The first infrastructure that appeared on Bhasan Char was a helipad, 
visible on satellite images in March 2017. In November that year, tracks 
began to appear. In January 2018 a portion of mangrove forest was 
cleared and a grid of roads was laid out. A month later the beginnings of 
the thirteen km long embankment aimed at preventing inundation at 
high tide began to be visible (Fig. 3). A Reuters Graphics sketch (2018) 
shows that these defences comprised offshore breakwaters, 300–400 m 
of foreshore and an embankment. The embankment was a 32 m wide, 
2.5 m high berm of compacted sand covered by a 1-m thick layer of 
undefined anti-erosive material (Reuters Graphics, 2018). The area in-
side the embankment was divided into 120 plots, each for twelve 
housing blocks arranged in pinwheel formation around three courtyards 
(Reuters Graphics, 2018). The blocks were built on concrete columns 
which elevated them 1,2 m above surface level. Each block was to house 
sixteen families, each family in a 3m x 4 m room arranged back to back, 
eight in a row, with no cross ventilation, accessed via walkways on each 
long side. There were two shared kitchens at one end of each block, eight 
toilets at the other and solar panels on the roof. The plan was to build 
1440 of these blocks to house 100,000 refugees. This barracks type 
housing was one of two alternatives proposed by the local administra-
tion. The other was a cluster village type that included small yards 
adjacent to housing blocks and a tube well for every six to seven families. 
However, it was estimated that only 250,000 people could be accom-
modated on the island in cluster villages as opposed to 400,000 in 
barracks, suggesting that the longer term plan was to develop the island 
to accommodate more than 100,000 people (Shaqif, 2017c; 2017a). 
The engineering corps of the Bangladesh Navy was given re-
sponsibility for overseeing construction of the infrastructure. It was the 
largest construction project it had ever undertaken. The plan was dub-
bed Asrayan 3, (asrayan meaning to shelter) and completion was plan-
ned for the end of 2019 (Kahn, 2018). Asrayan was a project inaugurated 
by the Bangladesh Navy in 1996 to “rehabilitate the homeless and 
landless people of the rural area” (Bangladesh Navy, 2018). Between 
2003 and 2018, it had constructed 3022 barracks type housing blocks at 
an average of 201 per year compared with the 720 per year required for 
Bhasan Char. Heavy duty construction equipment (excavators, trucks, 
lorries), construction materials (stone, aggregate, cement, bricks) and 
day labour was contracted to meet this target. A frenzy of activity 
resulted, as observed by a reporter who journeyed to the site: “when the 
boat reached the island, hundreds of water vessels carrying construction 
materials were seen in the area. Workers were busy uploading these 
materials. After entering Bhasan Char, this correspondent also found 
trucks and lorries carrying bricks and stones. Excavators were seen 
piling up mud for the construction of the embankment. Roads have been 
built across the char and several officer cadets of the Bangladesh Navy 
were seen roaming the construction site on bikes” (Raju, 2018). By 
October 2018, construction was underway on the bulk of the develop-
ment (Fig. 4). 
That month a video was posted to YouTube via a website platform 
called The Stateless Rohingya(The Stateless Rohingya, 2018) run from 
the Republic of Ireland. The video documents a helicopter flight over the 
Bhasan Char construction site. Seen against a vast oceanic horizon, the 
facility is approached from the mangrove covered portion of the island. 
The helicopter flies over the embankment and helicopter pad before 
zooming in closer to the housing blocks. These are in varying stages of 
completion – some are still a grid of columns, some are concrete slabs, 
some are completed up to roof height, some are covered with 
low-pitched, bright red, corrugated metal roofs. They are densely ar-
ranged in pin wheel fashion around courtyards, all of which are 
waterlogged. Interspersed between the fractal pattern of housing blocks 
are larger four storeyed concrete framed structures, whose purpose is 
not apparent, but they could be cyclone shelters. 
The video confirmed a number of things. Firstly, it confirmed Bhasan 
Char’s isolation - no other landforms are visible on the horizon 
throughout the video. Secondly, it confirmed that the facility’s purpose 
was detentive. Its dense mat of cellular housing blocks, encircling 
embankment and the ocean do not suggest infrastructure conducive to 
civilian life, but rather the kinds of infrastructure associated with 
incarceration. Thirdly and most significant for the argument in this 
paper, it confirmed that Bhasan Char was “hardly an island at all” 
(Yanofsky & Lahiri, 2017a), but rather a shifting, accumulation of 
terraqueous matter-energy in the process of being stabilised by man-
groves, but whose surface had barely emerged from the sea. Its measure 
was more bathymetric than topographic. Questions of detention became 
entangled with questions of currents, tides, winds and waves. The video 
confirmed that the refugees were to be relocated into a sea of geo-hydro 
uncertainty, where their statelessness (denial of jus soli) would be 
matched by material groundlessness. It reminded me of the opening 
Fig. 3. Satellite image of Bhasan Char in July 2018. Source: Google Earth.  
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question in Suvendrini Perera’s Australia and the Insular Imagination 
(Perera, 2009, p. 1) “What if the ground beneath our feet turns out to be 
the sea?” While her question was aimed at a critique of Australian 
exceptionalism, it could equally be used to question the potential con-
sequences of the incarceration of stateless refugees on a floating plat-
form of sediment in the sea, where they would be in the direct path of 
cyclones and storm surges and where there was little evidence that 
human life could be sustained (Ferrie, 2018; Paul et al., 2018). 
The plan was forcefully opposed by human rights groups and the 
refugees themselves. Human Rights Watch characterized it as a disaster 
in the making (Kullab, 2017) and the humanitarian Inter Sector Coor-
dination Group (ISCG) overseeing the refugee camps expressed deep 
caution about the plan (Mostofa, 2018). It feared that refugees would 
not be given free and informed choice to relocate to the island, which 
would then constitute arbitrary detention (Ferrie, 2018). The executive 
director of Ain-O-Salish-Kendra (ASK), a leading Bangladeshi human 
rights organisation said “as far we know, this island is uninhabitable. In 
these conditions, shifting Rohingya refugees there is not rational and it is 
inhumane … It requires huge time and money to make this island 
liveable. Within this short time and capacity, I don’t think, it will be 
possible’’ (Radio Free Asia, 2017). In an open letter to the Prime Min-
ister of Bangladesh published in the Dhaka Tribune in February 2017, the 
refugee community of Kutupalong argued that relocation to Bhasan Char 
“amounted to imprisonment in a flood-prone place of extreme isolation, 
” which would “only jeopardize the lives of thousands of refugees” 
(Sakhawat, 2017). They voiced suspicions that the relocation, while 
mooted as temporary, would be permanent, and designed to keep them 
from ever leaving the island pending unlikely repatriation to Myanmar. 
They appealed for a “durable and lasting solution” without moving them 
from where they were (Sakhawat, 2017). 
The official position by Bangladesh at home and abroad was that the 
Bhasan Char facility was intended to provide the refugees with hu-
manitarian support (Kuri, 2017). A local politician told The Bangla 
Tribune that the project was very important for humanitarian reasons 
and for the ‘rehabilitation’ of the refugees (Shaqif, 2017b). Planning 
Minister A.H.M. Mustafa argued that conditions where the Rohingya 
refugees were living were inhumane and that the project aimed to 
provide them with shelter (Radio Free Asia, 2017). At an event I 
attended in London in July 2018 on the occasion of the upgrading of 
Bangladesh from a least developed to a developing country, the 
Bangladesh High Commissioner spoke proudly of Bangladesh’s policy 
towards the Rohingya as a humanitarian role model for the rest of the 
world. The statement was echoed by Anne Main, Chair of the UK Par-
liamentary Group on Bangladesh, who said that she was in awe of the 
country’s generosity, which was a beacon of good practice and evidence 
of the agility of the Bangladeshi people to respond to crisis. Was it a 
coincidence that this re-framing of the country’s identity from problem 
to role model on the global stage was made on the occasion of the 
celebration of its upwardly mobile credit rating and to promote of the 
idea that Bangladesh was open for business? 
When measured against other more localised political, economic and 
territorial dynamics, other narratives emerge. 2018 was an election year 
in Bangladesh. Teknaf was a ruling Awami League constituency, 
whereas neighbouring Cox’s Bazaar was a Jamaat-e-Islami one. Its 
Awami League candidate was a popular leader who campaigned using 
anti-Rohingya rhetoric (LSE-UC Berkeley Bangladesh Summit, 2018). 
The Rohingya were branded as a social problem, involved in criminal 
activities (drug and human trafficking) and as bearers of disease, 
including HIV-Aids (Shaqif, 2017a). They were accused of being unde-
serving (Ahmed, 2008) of scarce resources that could be directed else-
where. Some saw the potential for the Rohingya to disperse across the 
country and create all kinds of hindrances in economic and cultural life 
(Kahn, 2018; Kalloi, 2017). Fears were expressed that interactions be-
tween Rohingya and local people would lead to intermarriage and other 
kinds of integration and make repatriation to Myanmar more difficult. 
The refugee camps were also seen as impediments to the economic po-
tential offered by newly constructed Asian Highway 41 (AH41), a 
long-awaited sub-regional highway in the Asian Highway network 
Fig. 4. Satellite image of Bhasan Char in April 2019. Source: Google Earth.  
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extending from Dhaka to Teknaf (Daily Star, 2009; Guhathakurta, 
2018). Tropes of criminality, contagion, impurity and undeservedness 
constructed the Rohingya as stateless entities to be defended against. 
Bangladesh’s commitment to hospitality towards the Rohingya on a 
global stage required that it balance a commitment to non-refoulement 
(the customary principle in international law that forbids a country 
receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they 
would be in danger of persecution), with a commitment to itself as a 
sovereign post-colonial state open for business. The Rohingya presence 
in Bangladesh threatened to subvert this as it reactivated the historical 
archive of movement, entanglement and surplus of potentially that had 
long existed between Bangladesh and Myanmar’s borderlands. Bhasan 
Char was Bangladesh’s way of solving these problems. It appeared to 
proffer the Rohingya hospitality and shelter while re-asserting stable 
notions of Bangladeshi citizenship and territorial sovereignty. It reas-
sured Bangladeshis that their government was able to separate the 
healthy from the infected, control migration and police their borders 
(Mountz, 2011). It appeared to offer the Rohingya stability and pro-
tection until they could return to Myanmar. This solution forgot or chose 
to ignore that Bhasan Char is a shifting, unconsolidated agglomeration of 
Himalayan sediment enveloped by and unfolding in earth forces that are 
inhospitable to humans. While the energy-matter of sediment might 
eventually bed down into strata, here it still swirled with ongoing po-
tentiality and impolitic re-combinatory possibilities (Deleuze & Guat-
tari, 1994). The char elaborated an impossible encounter between the 
refugees and the powerful earth system dynamics of the Meghna Estu-
ary. Military engineering was deployed to lock in its intensities and 
flows. Imminent to this militarised infrastructure was the de-stratifying 
potential of the planetary forces it was designed to capture - constantly 
in motion, always threatening to exceed, and utterly indifferent to 
human survival. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have taken up two related challenges posed by Clark 
and Yusoff (2017) in the light of climate change and the Anthropocene: 
to engage more closely with the dynamics of earth systems, and to 
consider how social and political agency is constrained, made possible 
and emergent with earth forces. The objectives of the paper were framed 
by my encounters with sediment and its extraordinary volume and force 
in a developing monsoonal research methodology in south and southeast 
Asia. Thinking with sediment unlocked knowledge about the earth 
beyond that of static, solid earthiness. It thoroughly undermined the 
position that holds that the earth is a stable platform upon which dy-
namic social processes play out. It invested terra itself with a mobile, 
terraqueous materiality that exceeded attempts to divide it according to 
land/water binaries. As a materiality derived from interactions between 
geological, hydrological and atmospheric dynamics, sediment similarly 
confounded attempts to confine questions of territoriality to abstract 
surfaces. Its materiality foregrounded the “manifold agencies, materi-
alities and forces of nature that undergrid territorial space” (Usher, 
2019, p. 17). 
In the paper, I have explored the extent to which sediment’s mobile, 
terraqueous materiality was inflected in or interfered with attempts by 
Bangladesh to house Rohingya refugees in its territory, in the camps in 
south-east Bangladesh and on Bhasan Char in the Meghna Estuary. I 
found that, in both the refugee camps and the char, the materiality of 
sediment exceeded and undercut the engineered machinic assemblies 
put together by Bangladesh to stratify and territorialize refugee life. The 
terraqueous sedimentary terrains on which the refugees were grounded 
served as an ongoing, affective reminder of the unruliness of territorial 
materialities in relation to territorializing agendas, as well as of the 
precarity and valuelessness of stateless life to statist machines. 
The paper thus makes a contribution to emerging scholarship on the 
volatile, intractable more-than-human terrains which impede or disrupt 
a state’s vision (Usher, 2019). These include Gordillo (2018) on 
mountain warfare in Afghanistan; Clark and Jones (2017) in their study 
of state formation in Iceland; Bremner (2015) on the failed search into 
the disappearance of Malaysian flight MH370; Barry (2013) on the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in Georgia, and many others. As Clark 
(2011: xiii) argues, “the raw physicality of the world is rising up the 
agenda” not only because of concern over the ways in which human 
demands are pressing against the physical limits of the earth and its 
systems, but also in order to come to terms with “a planet that constantly 
rumbles, folds, cracks, erupts, irrupts” (xiv). How we organize our re-
lations with it and the care and support we show for those who have 
been struck by its force might open the way to geopolitical recalibration. 
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